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PETITION AND BRIEF 
FOR REHEARING 
Case No. 19097 
PETITION AND BRIEF FOR REHEARING 
Petitioner seeks a ruling from this Court reversing its 
uccision filed on August 26, 1985, and requests this Court to 
sustain the ruling of the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts are set out in Petitioner's Brief heretofore 
[ilea in this cause. 
ABGUIIBNT 
Petitioner respectfully requests this Court to recon-
s1oer its opinion heretofore issued in this case. Petitioner ad-
:tits the Supreme Court has issued its opinion on the sole issue 
of collateral estoppel. In spite of this fact, other issues were 
ra1seo not only in the pleadings, the decision of the trial court 
ano in ti1e parties' briefs that have been submitted to this Court 
\'Lieb were not addressed in this Court's decision. 
POINT I 
ISSUES RAISED BY THE PLEADINGS IN THE LO\IER COURT 
L'HICH 1:ER£ CONSIDERED AND RULED UPON IN THE sumlARY 
JUDGEEUT, BUT WERE NOT ADDRESSED BY THE SUPREHE 
COURT IN I'l'S RULING. 
Obviously, one of the issues raised dealt with the 
issue of collateral estoppel as a defense to the Appellant 
in the current action. 
;,tthuL;':L Petitioner does not agree with this Court's 
:t to 1ecLCiH this issue. 
_l_ 
The sole justification presented by the Appellant ir1 
relitigating the boundary located between Davis ana \ieber 
Counties was that in the Toone v. LeGrande Johnson Construction, 
case, Civil No. 20915, the Court used the time of Statehood 
(18961 as the critical time for determining this boundary insteaci 
of 1866. IR. 1411 Obviously, if the present Appellant sought to 
try his case on the same basis as the case, supra, their 
changes of prevailing would be for the most part, minimal. The 
primary issue of the location of the county line is only preliLl-
inary to the ultimate decision of whether Davis County could 
properly have sold the subject property at its tax sale. 
The present arguments of the Appellant on whether the 
critical date for determining the county boundary line were not 
only argued as a post trial motion in the .T..Q..Q.n.e case, supra, but 
in the Appellant's Brief. ( R. 141 I 
Obviously, because of the foregoing being contc.ined in 
the Briefs of the parties it is tair to assume the lower court 
considerea these arguments and legal r.1er,10ranaa in the IT1aking of 
its decision. The lower court, exclusive of any collateral 
estoppel arguments concluaed there were 110 issues of fact to uE 
decided. (R. 2501 The Court specitically affirrnea this in ics 
oecision. ( R. 251 I 
It being a legal aeterrni11ation c.s to thE criticcd cace 
for determining the recognized boundary t.et1.·0u, La·d '· zcnu ' .. Er c L 
Counties. The critical date was c:rsued to Llie iv,·:cL ,,,2,:. 
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concluoea that the time of Statehood, (1896) was the critical 
to oeten1ine the location of the bounaary between Davis and 
1:rner Counties. The foregoing decision of the trial court was 
;,,aae independently of any collateral estoppel arguments. (R. 
251) 
Consequently, the issue on the location of the Davis 
1;eber County boundary was raised, argued and ruled on in the 
lower court and was not done so on the basis oJ: collateral 
estoppel. This issue alone would provide the Supreme Court with 
e:-iousi1 Ji.:stification to affirm the decision of the trial court. 
POINT II 
THE LQ;iER COURT RULED THAT THE APPELLANT'S TAX 
ul::ED \:As VOID. 
It was raised in Appellant's brief (R. 124) the issue 
referred to above. The trial court was aware that Davis County, 
to the Appellant's filing their Complaint, abated and re-
to che Appellant any taxes they rnay have previously paid 
ik. 108, 109) refused to assess or accept taxes on the 
hdA'llcrot' s six acres. Also, Davis County changed its plat maps 
'.F:. 110) to reflect that Appellant's six acres were located in 
\,'eLer County. All of the foregoing was raised, briefed and 
co the trial court. The lower court then ruleo as a 
· c·1 101-.· tl:.:it c_he Aupellar,t could not r<1c.intc.in this action 
u,e 1·c.1t1<·ner. Easeu upon the foregoing, it is the 
- 3-
issue provided a separate basis for the Supreme Court to afrirr, 
This issue was never addressed by the Supreme Court in its rulinu 
of reversal. 
CONCLUSION 
Petitioner respectfully submits that the Court in 
rendering its opinion in the instant case erred in that: 
1. It based its entire decision on the issue of 
collateral estoppel. 
2. This Court failed to consiaer that the trial court 
basea its ruling and made its decision that the critical time for 
aetermining the boundary between Davis and lleber was 1896. 
3. This Court failed to consider that the trial court 
specifically found that Appellant's aeed bad been voiueci by Davis 
County and had been done so prior to the filing of the present 
action. 
Petitioner further submits that the Suprerc1e Court 
failea to consider the two issues referred to above in the ren-
dering of its decision. The sole basis ot tne CoLrt's 
decision was that collateral estoppel was not a barr co the 
Appellant's claims. 
That a reading of the record in the lower court reveals 
that at least two other issues were decided, neither of whicn 
were addressed by the Supreme Court. The cec1sicn of tne lc">:cr 
on either one of these issues would be a sufficient t.c:;1s tc,r 
Suprer.1e Court to affirm. It is the posit1or. of c[,i, P"cc1c1c.'1L'. 
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if Appellant has any claim whatsoever, it lies only against 
The Supreme Court has held on so many occasions in past 
cases tnat it is their position that a judgment under review 
should be affirmed if it is sustainable on any legal ground 
""parent from the record. Edward v. Iron County, 531 P.2d 476 
il975); Goocsel v. Dept. Bus. Reg., Utah, 523 P.2d 1230; 
Pecrecttion v. Cedar Hills Development, 614 P.2,d 155 <1980). 
This Petitioner feels this decision of the trial, 
of the reasons heretofore stated should be affirmed. 
DATED day of September, 1985. 
Respectfully submitted, 
(1 w 
STEPHEN . II ARD 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Petitioner-
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